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The State responds that Coe did not challenge the constitutionality of section 33.021(c) on those grounds at trial and, thus, has not preserved this issue for review.
He contends that when section 33.021(c) and (d) are combined, they explicitly criminalize fantasy speech, which he argues is protected by the First Amendment.
In determining whether a complaint on appeal comports with that made at trial, we consider the context in which the complaint was made and the parties' shared understanding at that time. Coe filed a motion for new trial and motion in arrest of judgment, arguing only that the verdict is contrary to the law and evidence under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 21.3.
The trial court overruled Coe's motion for directed verdict and overruled Coe's objections to the constitutionality of the statute.
A party must challenge the constitutionality of a statute as applied in the trial court to preserve error.
Likewise, a party may not raise for the first time on appeal a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute.
“Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Hooper, 214 S. However, as we discussed above, the indictment clearly charges Coe with a violation of subpart (c) of the statute. Rather, it requires a person to solicit a minor “over the Internet, by electronic mail or text message or other electronic message service or system, or through a commercial online service[.]” Id. ref'd) (quoting Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2169 (2002)). B., a minor, over the Internet to meet with him or another person with the intent that E. would engage in sexual contact, sexual intercourse, or deviate sexual intercourse with him or another person.
Virginia legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” Brooks v. We overrule Coe's first issue to the extent he alleges Count I of the indictment was unconstitutional because he was indicted under section 33.021(b), which has been found to be unconstitutional. Here, because the body of the indictment alleges an offense under subsection (c) of section 33.021 and not an offense under subsection (b), the fact that the caption references a third-degree felony is of no consequence. The indictment alleged that Coe “did then and there, with the intent that E. Constitutional challenges to a statute are generally forfeited by failure to object at trial.
Alternatively, he argues that if we conclude the indictment extended to the G-chat communications, the State also had the burden to show those communications were sexually explicit. App.1991) (holding that “although the indictment may allege the differing methods of committing the offense in the conjunctive, it is proper for the jury to be charged in the disjunctive”).